2011/03/05
2011/03/03
"Public concern" in Snyder v. Phelps
The Court may have gotten the decision correct in this case, but not the opinion, and that was because it was not argued as well as it should have been on behalf of Snyder, et al.
First, it is not correct to base the decision on the First Amendment. That only restricts government actors involving legislation, not private actors. It is properly a case of equity over the private rights of the opposing actors in conflict.
The argument could have acknowledged that the position of Phelps, et al., was the expression of a matter of public concern, while demanding that such expression conflicted with the privacy rights of Snyder, et al., and that to resolve the conflict, it was reasonable to put time, place, and manner restrictions on Phelps, et al. In other words, to separate them by a reasonable distance.
There have to be bounds on inflicting emotional distress on a private party as a way to get public attention. If Phelps, et. al., had shouted their message with a megaphone into the ears of Snyder, et. al., that would be a clear violation, as would pointing an unloaded gun at them. So there are ways to inflict emotional distress for an expression of public concern that cross the line. The question is where to draw that line. In my view, the Court, instead of trying to draw that line carefully as a matter of equity, chose instead to make it a binary decision, on an incorrect constitutional ground. The Court is a court of equity as well as a court of law, and not all cases it hears are properly decided on constitutional grounds. If the aim was a prudential one of avoiding future litigation exploring the boundaries of how much emotional distress is too much, then it may have done that, but such issues are not properly avoided by courts. Ultimately, it is juries who should decide where to draw the lines. The court erred in not leaving it to them.
Now it has been argued by Malla Pollack that:
First, it is not correct to base the decision on the First Amendment. That only restricts government actors involving legislation, not private actors. It is properly a case of equity over the private rights of the opposing actors in conflict.
The argument could have acknowledged that the position of Phelps, et al., was the expression of a matter of public concern, while demanding that such expression conflicted with the privacy rights of Snyder, et al., and that to resolve the conflict, it was reasonable to put time, place, and manner restrictions on Phelps, et al. In other words, to separate them by a reasonable distance.
There have to be bounds on inflicting emotional distress on a private party as a way to get public attention. If Phelps, et. al., had shouted their message with a megaphone into the ears of Snyder, et. al., that would be a clear violation, as would pointing an unloaded gun at them. So there are ways to inflict emotional distress for an expression of public concern that cross the line. The question is where to draw that line. In my view, the Court, instead of trying to draw that line carefully as a matter of equity, chose instead to make it a binary decision, on an incorrect constitutional ground. The Court is a court of equity as well as a court of law, and not all cases it hears are properly decided on constitutional grounds. If the aim was a prudential one of avoiding future litigation exploring the boundaries of how much emotional distress is too much, then it may have done that, but such issues are not properly avoided by courts. Ultimately, it is juries who should decide where to draw the lines. The court erred in not leaving it to them.
Now it has been argued by Malla Pollack that:
As for the elements of the torts alleged -- The protesters were not even easily within sight of the funeral procession. They did not intrude on anyone's "seclusion"- even if, arguendo, a funeral of this sort is a "secluded" location. As for government actors, the court imposing civil liability on the protesters counts -- as does the public imposition of legal rules in defining the torts alleged -- NY Times v Sullivan, remember.To which I reply:
Yes, and on those facts the Court could properly draw the line and hold that the separation was sufficient to avoid actionable injury. All rights are subject to constraint or disablement by judicial due process, particularly where there is a conflict of rights. It is legislative restriction that may make the Ninth (not the First, which only restricts Congress) applicable, and that was not involved in this case. If the state had legislated reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions intended to reduce conflicts of rights, as long as the expression was not unduly burdened, that should not be considered a Speech Right violation. A statute creating a judicial jurisdiction for tort claims, and defining standards for such torts, is not per se a restriction of any of the rights involved, as long as it is narrowly and appropriately tailored to the facts of rights conflicts.
Sullivan based the right on the wrong amendment. It should have cited the Ninth, not the First. The Ninth includes all the other rights, and in particular, federally justiciable rights against the action of state actors.
2011/03/02
2011/03/01
Flaws in Balanced Budget Amendment
Sen. Jim Demint and others have introduced S. Joint Res. 38, The Balanced Budget Amendment. Although this would seem to be a good idea on its face, it has several flaws:
1. There is no effective enforcement mechanism. Congress could, and likely would, simply ignore it, and the courts would have neither the will nor a mechanism to enforce it. If someone sued to halt some expenditure, the courts could not decide that expenditure was in violation, and no one would have standing to sue over an entire budget.
2. There is nothing to prevent the government from simply creating more fiat currency out of thin air and calling it "receipts". Nothing is accomplished without eliminating fiat currency. If that is done, the rest takes care of itself. If it is not, then "balancing the budget" is a delusion.
3. It should be a concurrent resolution, not a joint resolution. Constitutional amendments need only be proposed by a 2/3 vote of both houses of Congress. They do not need the signature of the president, as a joint resolution does. A measure adopted by both houses that does not need the signature of the president is a concurrent resolution. This may seem to be a quibble, but members of Congress should know better.
The proper solution is an amendment to do away with fiat currency, such as this one:
Legal tender
Sen. Demint and others are approaching the subject from the wrong direction.
Note the addition of energy to the list of backings for currency. See this for more on that.
Some alternative proposed "balanced budget amendments" introduce other flaws. For example, S.J. 35 has a provision that uses the term "gross domestic product" (GDP), a poorly defined number that has no place in the Constitution.
Report of partial audit of the Fed showing $14 trillion issued to banks.
Budget debt
The main problem with debt is that any agency can add to the national debt, unconstrained by any spending budget. Don't have the money appropriated, just create an account payable with someone. No limit on that. We need to budget the creation of obligations as well as of spending. If it's not in the debt budget, an agency can't create it
1. There is no effective enforcement mechanism. Congress could, and likely would, simply ignore it, and the courts would have neither the will nor a mechanism to enforce it. If someone sued to halt some expenditure, the courts could not decide that expenditure was in violation, and no one would have standing to sue over an entire budget.
2. There is nothing to prevent the government from simply creating more fiat currency out of thin air and calling it "receipts". Nothing is accomplished without eliminating fiat currency. If that is done, the rest takes care of itself. If it is not, then "balancing the budget" is a delusion.
3. It should be a concurrent resolution, not a joint resolution. Constitutional amendments need only be proposed by a 2/3 vote of both houses of Congress. They do not need the signature of the president, as a joint resolution does. A measure adopted by both houses that does not need the signature of the president is a concurrent resolution. This may seem to be a quibble, but members of Congress should know better.
The proper solution is an amendment to do away with fiat currency, such as this one:
Congress shall have the power to define legal tender only on territory for which it has exclusive jurisdiction, and state legislatures only on exclusively state territory. Neither Congress nor the states may make anything legal tender that does not consist of, or is backed by, gold, silver, or energy, nor use anything but legal tender to pay its debts, or accept anything but legal tender for the payment of taxes.
Sen. Demint and others are approaching the subject from the wrong direction.
Note the addition of energy to the list of backings for currency. See this for more on that.
Some alternative proposed "balanced budget amendments" introduce other flaws. For example, S.J. 35 has a provision that uses the term "gross domestic product" (GDP), a poorly defined number that has no place in the Constitution.
Report of partial audit of the Fed showing $14 trillion issued to banks.
Budget debt
The main problem with debt is that any agency can add to the national debt, unconstrained by any spending budget. Don't have the money appropriated, just create an account payable with someone. No limit on that. We need to budget the creation of obligations as well as of spending. If it's not in the debt budget, an agency can't create it